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Since everyday actions are statistically structured, knowing which action a person has just completed allows 21 
predicting the most likely next action step. Taking even more than the preceding action into account improves 22 
this predictability, but also causes higher processing costs. Using fMRI, we investigated whether observers 23 
exploit 2nd-order statistical regularities preferentially if information on possible upcoming actions provided by 24 
1st-order regularities is insufficient. We hypothesized that anterior prefrontal cortex balances whether or not 2nd-25 
order information should be exploited. Participants watched videos of actions that were structured by 1st- and 26 
2nd-order conditional probabilities. Information provided by the 1st and by the 2nd order was manipulated 27 
independently. BOLD activity in the action observation network was more attenuated the more information on 28 
upcoming actions was provided by 1st- order structure, reflecting expectation suppression for more predictable 29 
actions. Activation in posterior parietal sites decreased further with 2nd-order information, but increased in 30 
temporal areas. As expected, 2nd-order information was integrated more when less 1st-order information was 31 
provided, and this interaction was mediated by anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10). Observers spontaneously 32 
used both the present and the preceding action to predict the upcoming action, and integration of the preceding 33 
action was enhanced when the present action was uninformative. 34 
 35 
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1. Introduction 38 
Humans use knowledge about structural regularities to shape their expectations about upcoming events 39 
(Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Kok, Brouwer, van Gerven, & de Lange, 40 
2013; Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008; Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson, & Chun, 41 
2010). A good example of this ability is action observation: actions provide a conditional structure of sequential 42 
action steps, so that knowing about a preceding action step improves predictability of the upcoming action 43 
(Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg, & Haroutunian, 2011). Therefore, it appears that the more preceding action steps an 44 
observer takes into account, the more accurate the prediction will be. For instance, we do expect that a person 45 
will put a tea bag into a mug after switching on a kettle, but we do not if we observed that person putting a 46 
descaler into the kettle right before. Here, the 1st-order conditional probability of “putting a tea bag in a mug” 47 
after observing “switching on a kettle” is modulated by taking one additional previous action step into account, 48 
which constitutes a 2nd-order conditional probability. However, retrieving this 2nd-order information comes with 49 
processing costs, and may thus not always be worth the investment. This leads to the question: do observers 50 
always consider as many preceding action steps as possible to optimize their predictions, or do they only do so if 51 
their expectation is hardly informed by the directly preceding action? We know that humans do not take into 52 
account all available sources of information to make optimal decisions, but often jump to conclusions, taking 53 
heuristic shortcuts (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). A basic question in human cognition concerns this cost-54 
benefit ratio: How much information processing is invested (as a cost) to optimize expectations and behavior (as 55 
a benefit)? 56 
Behavioral and functional MRI (fMRI) findings strongly suggest predictive mechanisms are engaged 57 
during action observation. Humans are particularly fast and accurate at recognizing actions, even if visual 58 
information is sparse (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007) or parts of the action are occluded (Stadler, Schubotz, & von 59 
Cramon, 2011; Zacks et al., 2011). The so-called action observation network (AON), including premotor cortex, 60 
inferior parietal lobule, and posterior temporo-occipital regions (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010) shows 61 
reduced activation for expected compared to unexpected actions (expectation suppression, see Summerfield & 62 
de Lange 2014; Summerfield et al. 2008). For instance, AON activation is attenuated by previous encounters of 63 
an action (Schiffer, Ahlheim, Ulrichs, & Schubotz, 2013), successful inference of action goals (Wurm, Hrkać, 64 
Morikawa, & Schubotz, 2014), or predictive regularities between action steps (Ahlheim, Stadler, & Schubotz, 65 
2014; Schubotz, Wurm, Wittmann, & von Cramon, 2014). This shows that the human brain exploits previous 66 
action steps to prepare for upcoming action steps. However, it is so far unknown how many previous action 67 
 
steps are considered to improve predictability, and whether this occurs as a function of the uncertainty regarding 68 
the next action step. 69 
In general, the predictability of an upcoming event depends on the degree of structure that underlies the 70 
event sequence, and knowledge of this structure allows for more accurate predictions. Using various paradigms 71 
and stimuli, it has been shown that humans spontaneously learn about 1st-order structures defined by conditional 72 
probabilities between successive items, which can be accessed directly through pairwise associations. Humans 73 
use knowledge of those probabilities to prepare for upcoming stimuli, both in abstract stimulus sequences as 74 
well as actions (Ahlheim et al., 2014; Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Fiser & Aslin, 2002; 75 
Swallow & Zacks, 2008; Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun, & Johnson, 2009). However, most everyday actions are 76 
not guided by simple 1st-order conditional probabilities, but involve higher-order (e.g., 2nd-order structures). 77 
Contrary to 1st-order information, 2nd-order information cannot be assessed directly, but requires retrieving 78 
information about the event t-2 from memory, and integrating it with the 1st-order information. This integration 79 
is necessary, as the event t-2 alone does not constitute the 2nd order, but only in combination with the event t-1. 80 
While the beneficial effects of 1st-order regularities on neural processing and behavior are uncontroversial, it 81 
remains unclear whether and how 2nd-order regularities influence behavior and prediction of upcoming events, 82 
and how this depends on concurrently available 1st-order information. Findings are mixed, as some studies do 83 
not show an effect of higher-order structures (Gureckis & Love, 2010), while others show that learning of 84 
higher-order structures is slower (Remillard, 2008), or not different from 1st-order learning (Domenech & 85 
Dreher, 2010). Research in amnestic patients revealed a specific deficit in the learning of higher-order 86 
conditional structures, whereas learning of 1st-order associations remained intact (Curran, 1989). This suggests 87 
that the hippocampal formation, which is frequently damaged in amnesia, specifically contributes to learning of 88 
higher-order compared to lower-order structures, additionally to its critical role in episodic memory and 89 
associative knowledge (Fortin, Agster, & Eichenbaum, 2002; Kumaran & Maguire, 2009; Strange & Dolan, 90 
2001).  91 
In order to account for the mixed findings on learning of higher-order structures, it has been suggested 92 
that humans are biased towards attending to lower-order structures, and only attend to higher-order structures if 93 
the information provided by the lower-order structure is insufficient to reliably predict the upcoming event 94 
(Gureckis & Love, 2010). It is so far unclear whether the same principle holds for action observation, and which 95 
neural structures could underpin this process of integration of predictive information. Recent findings indicate 96 
that the search and use of further information is orchestrated by the lateral BA 10 (Badre, Doll, Long, & Frank, 97 
2012; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). Badre et al. (2012) showed that activation in the BA 98 
 
10 increases with relative uncertainty about a potential action outcome, but only in participants that showed a 99 
so-called explorative behavior, i.e. participants that were searching for additional information from unknown 100 
choices. This links the BA 10 to explorative choice. In a similar vein, Daw et al. (2006) showed that activation 101 
in the lateral BA 10 is higher for explorative, or information-gathering, choices. Exploration can be understood 102 
as search for information, and higher activation in the BA 10 is also frequently observed during episodic or 103 
source memory retrieval tasks (Ramnani & Owen, 2004), that is, when information needs to be gathered from 104 
memory. Furthermore, the BA 10 has been associated with the integration of different sources of information 105 
(Nee, Jahn, & Brown, 2013). 106 
In the present fMRI study, we tested the hypothesis that observers’ exploitation of 2nd-order statistical 107 
information in action sequences depends on how much information was already provided by the 1st order. We 108 
used fMRI to test whether information from an observed action's 2nd-order statistical structure is used the more 109 
the less informative the action's 1st-order statistical structure is and whether this cost-efficient integration of 110 
information would be signified by BA 10 activity.  111 
We presented observers with videos of action sequences structured by 1st- and 2nd-order conditional 112 
probabilities. That is, the probability of a given action step t was to a quantifiable amount determined by the 113 
preceding action step t-1 (1st-order statistical structure) and to another amount by the combination of the 114 
preceding (t-1) and the last but one preceding action step t-2 (2nd-order statistical structure). Importantly, the 115 
amount of information provided by 1st- and by 2nd-order structure was varied independently. This enabled us to 116 
estimate both effects independently and also their interaction. We modeled the BOLD effect at the beginning of 117 
action t as a function of the amount of information provided by the action t-1 alone and by the combination of 118 
action t-1 and t-2. We expected three effects: 119 
1) First, we expected to replicate findings from our previous studies (Ahlheim et al., 2014; Wurm et al., 120 
2014), showing that facilitating the prediction of the upcoming action step leads to attenuation of activity in the 121 
AON. The more informative action t-1, the better the prediction of the upcoming action t. Accordingly, we 122 
expected the BOLD response in the action observation network to decrease with the amount of information 123 
provided by action t-1.  124 
2) At the same point in time, integrating information from action t-2 with information from action t-1 125 
can effectively modulate expectations based on the relation between the actions t-1 and t, and thereby increase 126 
predictability of action t. Unlike 1st-order information, 2nd-order information cannot be accessed through direct 127 
associations between stimuli, but requires action t-2 to be retrieved from working memory and integrated with 128 
action t-1. Moreover, previous encounters of a particular combination of preceding action steps need to be 129 
 
retrieved from long-term memory in order to derive information on upcoming actions from the combination. We 130 
expected the retrieval and integration of 2nd-order information to be reflected in the hippocampal formation, due 131 
to its role in learning of higher-order sequences (Curran, 1989; Fortin et al., 2002; Kumaran & Maguire, 2009; 132 
Strange & Dolan, 2001). Activation of the hippocampus has furthermore been found to correlate positively with 133 
amount of information provided on an upcoming event (Harrison, Duggins, & Friston, 2006). We assumed that 134 
this effect generalizes to higher-order structures and hypothesized that activation in the hippocampal formation 135 
will correlate positively with the amount of information provided by the 2nd order. Furthermore, we expected 136 
use of 2nd-order information to draw on the AON. Here, we considered two potential scenarios. First, given that 137 
the exploitation of 2nd-order information improves predictability of the upcoming action, it can be expected to 138 
result in a further attenuation of the AON, paralleling the effect of 1st-order information, and pointing towards 139 
an interpretation of AON activity as reflecting a gain in predictability. Alternatively, activation in the AON 140 
could also be expected to increase with the amount of 2nd-order information. This is because the more 141 
information is provided by the 2nd-order structure, the more the predictions based on the 1st-order change and 142 
thus, integrating 2nd-order information is more demanding. This pattern would point towards sensitivity of the 143 
AON to the integration costs of 2nd-order information with the previously provided 1st-order information. 144 
3) Lastly, we were particularly interested in the question as to how exploitation of 2nd-order 145 
information depends on the amount of information already provided by the 1st-order – that is, which brain areas 146 
show a stronger modulation by 2nd-order information when 1st-order is low compared to when it is high. We 147 
hypothesized that integration of 2nd-order information should be especially enhanced when action t-1 alone was 148 
less informative about the upcoming action t and the need for further information is high. Thus, we expected a 149 
stronger modulation of the BOLD-signal by the 2nd-order information for trials with low compared to high 1st-150 
order information. We expected Brodmann Area 10 at the frontal pole to show this interaction effect, as it has 151 
not only be reported to be activated by integration of information (Nee et al., 2013) but also to orchestrate 152 




2. Methods 156 
2.1 Participants 157 
Twenty-two healthy, right-handed participants volunteered for the study and were paid 80 € for their 158 
participation. The local ethics committee of the University of Münster approved the experimental protocol and 159 
written informed consent was obtained from each participant. Three participants had to be excluded after 160 
completing the experiment, one because of poor performance in the control task (score below two SD from 161 
mean), and two because of self-reported inattentiveness and sleep during the fMRI session. All following 162 
analyses are based on the data of the remaining 19 participants (mean age 25.35 ± 2.13 years, 14 females). 163 
 164 
2.2 Stimuli and Task 165 
We employed a paradigm that required constant monitoring of sequences of action steps that were 166 
structured by 1st- and 2nd-order conditional probabilities. To construct sequential actions devoid of semantic 167 
expectations, we used eight objects from the constructional toy Baufix® and defined the grasping and 168 
manipulation of an object as one action step. Overall, we created a total of 140 action sequences, ranging from 169 
four to nine action steps. Base-rate probability of occurrence was nearly identical for all action steps, ranging 170 
from 12% to 14%. Therefore, predictions of upcoming action steps could not reliably be based on frequency.  171 
To prevent participants from episodically remembering entire video clips as a basis for prediction we 172 
shot every sequence in seven versions, each with different starting scaffolds, which consisted of various 173 
different mounted objects (see Figure 1a for an illustration of the video clips). 174 
Action videos were displayed on a grey background in the middle of a computer screen. A fixation 175 
circle with a duration of 3 s, or adjusted length after question trials, preceded all videos. Within the videos, onset 176 
asynchronies of the single action steps ranged from 1.28 s to 12.24 s (mean 4.39 s).  177 
Approximately half of the video clips (64 of 140 during the training, 32 of 70 during the fMRI session) 178 
were followed by questions trials. Here, participants were required to answer questions concerning the previous 179 
video, e.g., “Has a long screw been used?”. Responses were given via computer mouse with the right button 180 
(i.e., middle finger of the right hand) corresponding to the answer “no” and the left button (i.e., right index 181 
finger) corresponding to “yes”. Half of the questions required a positive answer and all participants responded 182 
according to the same response contingencies. Questions were presented for 3 s or until the first response, and 183 
had to be answered within 3 s (see Figure 1a). The duration of the fixation circle following responses was 184 
adapted to compensate for different response times and could range from 2 to 5 s. Questions were followed by a 185 






a) Illustration of the trial course. A fixation circle preceded each 
video and 46% of the videos were followed by a two-alternative 
forced choice question. Feedback on correctness of responses was 
only given during the training sessions. b) Excerpt of the 
employed transition matrix. Rows 1-4 show 1st-order conditional 
probabilities between action steps, rows 5-12 show 2nd-order 
conditional probabilities. Objects in rows depict the preceding 
objects of the transition. Red marked are two examples for 
possible 1st-order transitions with high or low information. 
Transitions with high information provided by the 1st-order 
structure are marked with criss-cross lines (red for 1st-order 
conditional probabilities, light or dark blue for 2nd-order 
conditional probabilities). Light blue fields show exemplary 
transitions with low, dark blue fields with high modulatory 
influence of the 2nd-order structure. 
2.2.1 Markov Matrix 187 
The succession of action steps within the sequences followed pre-defined 1st- and 2nd-order conditional 188 
probabilities (see Figure 1b for an excerpt of the transition matrix). First-order conditional probability refers to 189 
the probability of each action step based on the immediately preceding action, ranging from 12.5% to 37.5% 190 
(rows 1-4 in the transition matrix, Figure 1b). The larger the difference between probabilities of the possible 191 
upcoming actions, the more information about the upcoming action was provided by the 1st-order structure. For 192 
instance, the blue cube provided more 1st-order information than the short screw, as it allowed for a better 193 
prediction of the upcoming action. Paralleling the 1st-order, the 2nd-order conditional probability refers to the 194 
probability of each action step based on the combination of the two preceding actions, ranging from 12.5% to 195 
87.5% (rows 5-12 in the transition matrix, Figure 1b). Here, the larger the difference between probabilities of 196 
the possible upcoming actions, i.e., between all actions within one row of the matrix, the more information was 197 
provided by the 2nd-order structure. For instance, if a screw nut preceded the short screw, it provided much 198 
information on the upcoming action: the previously balanced probabilities on the 1st-order structure would 199 
 
become biased, and putting the triangle would become the most likely action step. Contrary to that, a long screw 200 
preceding the short screw provided little information, as the probability ratio between the next possible actions 201 
stays the same. As can be seen from the matrix, the amount of information provided by the 2nd-order structure 202 
varied independently of the information provided by the 1st-order structure. This feature of the statistical 203 
structure is important as it allowed us to test if the amount of information provided by the 1st order affects 204 
exploitation of the 2nd order as an additional source of information. 205 
 206 
 207 
2.3 Experimental Procedure 208 
Prior to the fMRI scan, each participant completed three 90-minute training sessions on three 209 
successive days to acquire implicit knowledge of the statistical structure. Since we wanted to test if human 210 
observers spontaneously attend to different levels of statistical structure, participants did not receive explicit 211 
learning instructions at any point either in training or during the fMRI session, and were not told that there was a 212 
certain systematic concerning the structure of the action sequences. Participants were familiarized with the eight 213 
different objects as well as with the type of question they would be asked before they started the training 214 
sessions.  215 
The course of the fMRI session was identical to the training session, but no feedback was provided 216 
after question trials. To account for the limits in maximal duration of fMRI sessions, only 70 out of the 140 217 
action sequences were presented, resulting in approximately 45 minutes of fMRI scan. The selected 70 218 
sequences were a representative sample of the total set of sequences, while ensuring that rare action 219 
combinations (i.e. with low 1st- or 2nd-order conditional probabilities) occurred with sufficient frequency. 220 
To test our prediction that participants would be capable of learning both 1st- and 2nd-order conditional 221 
probabilities, we implemented two post-scanner tests to assess participants’ knowledge of the action syntax.  222 
The first computer-based post-test was a serial reaction time task (SRTT, Nissen & Bullemer 1987) 223 
wherein pictures of the eight Baufix objects occurred at different locations on the screen. Unknown to the 224 
participants, the succession of the objects was defined by the same statistical structure as in the main 225 
experiment. Participants had to press a button, specifically assigned to each of the objects on an eight-button 226 
response pad as fast as possible. Wrong answers were followed by a negative feedback. This test was designed 227 
to test whether reaction times (RTs) would be modulated by both 1st- and 2nd-order conditional probability of the 228 
occurring object. 229 
 
The second post-test was a paper-pencil test. Eight video clips were presented in randomized order. 230 
Videos ended after the actor had used one object and reached for another. The participants’ task was to mark 231 
those objects out of the set of eight that they expected to be used next and to weight them according to their 232 
respective probability. They made this judgment in the form of eight crosses, which they could assign among the 233 
eight objects. For instance, if participants saw a clip in which the long screw had been used and they expected 234 
the board and the screw nut afterwards with equal probabilities, they assigned four crosses to each of them. The 235 
number of eight crosses allowed participants to select up to all eight possible objects and to weigh them 236 
accurately (each cross corresponded to p= .125). 237 
 238 
2.4 Data Acquisition 239 
A 3T Siemens Magnetom Trio (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) system equipped with a standard 240 
birdcage head coil was used in the functional imaging session. Participants lay supine in the scanner and their 241 
right hand was placed on a four-button response-box. Index and middle finger were placed on the response 242 
buttons and response contingencies were the same as in the training sessions. Participants’ heads and arms were 243 
stabilized using form-fitting cushions, and earplugs were provided to attenuate scanner noise. The experiment 244 
was presented via a mirror that was built into the head coil and adjusted individually to provide a good view of 245 
the entire screen.  246 
During the functional imaging, 28 axial slices (128.8 mm field of view, 4 mm thickness, 0.6 mm 247 
spacing; in-plane resolution of 3x3 mm) parallel to the bi-commissural line (AC-PC) were collected using a 248 
single-shot gradient echo-planar (EPI) sequence (2000 ms repetition time; echo time 30 ms, flip angle 90°, serial 249 
recording, 1260 repetitions) blood-oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. After the functional imaging, 250 
28 slices of anatomical T1-weighted MDEFT images (4 mm thickness, 0.6 mm spacing) were acquired. 251 
High-resolution 3D T1-weighted whole brain MDEFT sequences (128 sagittal slices, 1 mm thickness) 252 
were recorded for each participant in a separate session for improved localization of activation foci. Functional 253 
data were offline motion-corrected using the Siemens motion protocol PACE (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). 254 
Further processing was conducted with the LIPSIA software package, version 2.1 (Lohmann et al., 2001). To 255 
correct for temporal offsets between the slices acquired in one scan, a cubic-spline interpolation was used. To 256 
remove low-frequency signal changes and baseline drifts from the BOLD signal, we applied a high-pass filter of 257 
1/89 – 1/70 Hz, defined by an algorithm implemented in the Lipsia software package. Functional data slices 258 
were aligned with a 3D stereotactic coordinate system. The matching parameters (six degrees of freedom, three 259 
rotational, three translational) of the T1-weighted 2D-MDEFT data onto the individual 3D-MDEFT reference 260 
 
set were calculated. These parameters were used in a transformation matrix for a rigid spatial registration, 261 
normalized to a standardized Talairach brain size (x = 135, y = 175, z = 120 mm; Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) 262 
by linear scaling. Thereafter the normalized transformation matrices were applied to the functional slices in 263 
order to transform them using trilinear interpolation and align them with the 3D-reference set in the stereotactic 264 
coordinate system. The spatial resolution of the resulting functional data was 3 mm * 3 mm * 3 mm (27 mm3). 265 
A spatial Gaussian filter of 8 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) was applied to the data. 266 
 267 
2.5 Data Analyses 268 
2.5.1 Information Theoretical Modeling 269 
To operationalize the amount of information provided by the 1st and 2nd order, respectively, we used 270 
measures derived from information theory and an ideal observer model to estimate conditional probabilities of 271 
action steps (cf. Ahlheim et al. 2014; Bornstein & Daw 2012; Harrison et al. 2006; Strange, Duggins, Penny, 272 
Dolan, & Friston, 2005). Therefore, simulated probabilities were calculated across the training session, and 273 
continued through the scanning session. The base probabilities (p) of single items were calculated as the number 274 
of occurrences n of item xt divided by the sum of all items xi that have appeared so far (see equation 1). 275 
Conditional probabilities were calculated by dividing the probability of co-occurrence of two items by the 276 
preceding item’s base probability (see equation 1b); this formula was extended for the case of 2nd-order 277 








Equation 1a. Calculation of base probabilities. 281 




Equation 1. Calculation of 1st-order conditional probabilities.  283 
 284 
The amount of information provided by an event can be quantified as the degree to which uncertainty 285 
about an upcoming event is reduced. Uncertainty can be represented as entropy (H) (Equation 2), which is 286 
higher when unexpected events are probable (Cover & Thomas, 1991; Shannon, 1948). Entropy is therefore also 287 
referred to as expected surprise. The surprise of an event is defined as the negative logarithm of its probability, 288 
i.e. the surprise of an event is higher if the event was less likely. Formally, entropy is maximal if all possible 289 
 
events are equally likely to occur, so that pevent = 1/nevents. On the 1st order, the entropy about possible upcoming 290 
events (members of X) after occurrence of one other event (member xt-1 of all X) can be quantified as forward 291 
entropy (Ahlheim et al. 2014; Bornstein & Daw 2012, see Equation 3). If the forward entropy H(X|xt-1) is 292 
smaller than the general entropy H(X), occurrence of xt-1 provided information about the occurrence of X. This 293 
information I1 can be quantified as the difference between the general entropy H(X) and the forward entropy 294 
(taking the preceding event into account, i.e., H(X|xt-1)). The same logic applies to information provided by the 295 
2nd order I2, which can be quantified as the difference between the 1st-order forward entropy H(X| xt-1) and the 296 
2nd-order forward entropy H(X| xt-1, xt-2) (Equation 4). To ensure that differences between 1st- and 2nd-order 297 
forward entropy were not driven by different 1st-order conditional probabilities, we normalized the forward 298 
entropy by the 1st-order probability of co-occurrence.  299 
 300 
H X( )= p xti( )∗−log p xti( )
i
∑  301 
Equation 2. Calculation of the general entropy. 302 
 303 
H X xt−1( )= p xt−1( ) p xti | xt−1( )∗−log p xti | xt−1( )
i
∑  304 
Equation 3. Calculation of the 1st-order forward entropy. 305 
 306 
H X xt−1, xt−2( )= p xt−1, xt−2( ) p xti | xt−1, xt−2( )∗−log p xti | xt−1, xt−2( )
i
∑  307 
Equation 4. Calculation of the 2nd-order forward entropy. 308 
 309 
2.5.2 Behavioral Analysis of post-fMRI Tests 310 
The behavioral analysis was conducted with the statistic software package R, version 3.1 (R 311 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria) and SPSS statistics version 22 (SPSS Inc. Chicago, 312 
Illinois, USA). If not indicated otherwise, all inferential decisions were based on an alpha level of .05.  313 
 314 
3) SRTT Analysis 315 
The first post-fMRI test, the SRTT, was designed to measure whether RTs were modulated by 1st- and 316 
2nd-order conditional probability. This would provide evidence for implicit learning of the respective orders. To 317 
 
test for this, we conducted a multiple regression analysis separately for each participant, which included the 318 
predictors of 1st-order conditional probability and 2nd-order conditional probability (see Equation 1) as well as 319 
the trial number to control for general learning effects. Using multiple regressions enables us to identify how 320 
much each predictor contributes to the observed data in the context of the simultaneously available predictors. 321 
Only correct trials with an RT between 100 ms and 2000 ms were included in the analysis. On average, 7 % (45 322 
of 651 trials) were excluded per participant. One participant had to be excluded due to excessively prolonged 323 
RTs (z> 2), resulting in 18 participants in the final analysis of the SRTT. To account for the non-normal 324 
distribution of the RT data, all RTs were logarithmized prior to analysis. For each participant, we obtained one 325 
standardized regression coefficient that reflected how strongly their RTs were modulated by the 1st-order 326 
conditional probabilities, and one that reflected how strongly RTs were modulated by 2nd-order conditional 327 
probabilities, while controlling for effects of the respective other predictor. Those standardized regression 328 
coefficients were tested for significant deviation from zero, using separate one-sample t-tests (cf. Bornstein & 329 
Daw, 2012 for a similar approach).  330 
 331 
2) Paper-Pencil Analysis 332 
The second post-fMRI test was a paper-pencil test where we assessed participants’ explicit knowledge 333 
of the 1st-order structure. One participant failed to complete the post-test and was thus excluded from the 334 
analysis. We aggregated the number of crosses for the underlying true probability level (0, 12.5, 25, 37.5), for 335 
instance, how many crosses a participant distributed on average for a 0.25 conditional probability between 336 
action steps. This data was entered into a univariate ANOVA with the factor PROBABILITY (0, 0.125, 0.25, 337 
0.375) to test for significant differences between the levels. To test for the expected increase of probability 338 
ratings with implemented probabilities, planned paired t-tests between the successive probability levels were 339 
conducted. 340 
 341 
2.5.3 fMRI Data analysis 342 
For the statistical evaluation of the BOLD signal, a design matrix was generated modeling events with 343 
a delta (stick) function, convolved with the hemodynamic response function (gamma function; Glover 1999). 344 
All modeled actions had a minimal inter-stimulus-interval of 2 seconds. The first two actions of each sequence 345 
were discarded, as 2nd-order information was not available for those. The general linear model included five 346 
regressors, which were modeled time-locked to the onset of the action steps and with a duration of 1 s. Onset of 347 
 
action steps was defined as the moment the hand started to reach towards the next object. The first regressor 348 
served as a baseline and was modeled with an amplitude of 1.  349 
To model information provided by the 1st order, we included a parametric regressor in which entries in 350 
the amplitude vector corresponded to the amount of information provided by the 1st order (I1). Paralleling this 351 
account, we included another parametric regressor in which entries in the amplitude vector corresponded to the 352 
amount of information provided by the 2nd order (I2). To assess whether exploitation of the 2nd-order information 353 
depended on whether the 1st-order structure provided more or less information, we constructed an additional 354 
parametric regressor which modeled only those events for which the amount of information provided by the 1st 355 
order fell within the 1st or 4th quartile of the distribution of information provided by the 1st order (lowest and 356 
highest 25%). The amplitude entries on this regressor corresponded to the interaction term of 1st- and 2nd-order 357 
information, calculated as their mean-centered product (see Figure 2a for an illustration for the course of the 358 
parametric regressors during an excerpt of the experiment).  359 
In addition to the parameters modeling amount of provided information, we included the 1st-order 360 
conditional surprise, i.e., the negative logarithm of each action step’s conditional probability, as a nuisance 361 
regressor. Amplitudes of all parametric regressors where separately z-scored for each participant. 362 
To account for question trials and general effects of observing actions, we included question trials with 363 
a duration of 3 s and video clips with a duration according to the duration of the video, both with an amplitude 364 
of 1.  365 
We corrected for multiple comparisons by applying a two-step correction approach, resulting in a 366 
correction at p< .05 at the cluster level. In the first step, an initial z-threshold of 2.57 (p< .01, two-tailed) was 367 
defined. All voxels showing activation above this threshold entered the second step of the correction. Here, a 368 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to define thresholds for cluster-size and cluster-value at a significance level of 369 
p< .05. The combination of cluster size and cluster value decreases the risk of neglecting true activations in 370 
small structures. Thus, all reported activations were significant at p< .05, corrected for multiple comparisons at 371 









a) Example course of the parametric regressors for 1st-order information (red), 2nd-order information (blue), and their interaction term (black) 
during an excerpt of the experiment. b) Parametric effects of the amount of information provided by the 1st- order statistical structure. PMv: 
ventral premotor cortex, mIPS: midposterior intraparietal sulcus, pMTG: posterior middle temporal gyrus. c) Parametric effects of the 
amount of information provided by the 2nd- order statistical structure. mIPS: midposterior intraparietal sulcus, pMTG: posterior middle 
temporal gyrus, SPOC: superior parieto-occipital cortex, TempPole: temporal pole. d) Overlay of the parametric effects of the 1st- and 2nd-
order statistical structure in observed action videos. Effects of 1st-order information are displayed in red, 2nd-order in blue. Effects of both 
parameters overlapped in the midposterior intraparietal sulcus (yellow) and comprised 1188mm3 (59.46% of the activation cluster revealed 
in the 1st-order contrast) in the right and 432mm3 (5.05%) in the left hemisphere. e) Interaction of parametric effects of the amount of 
information provided by the 2nd-order statistical structure and the amount of information provided by the 1st-order structure. The bar chart 
depicts beta-values in the BA 10 when the interaction term modeled only events with high 1st-order information (light blue, t(18)= -0.18, p= 
.855), low 1st-order information (dark blue, t(18)= -3.12, p= .006), and the interaction effect when events with high or low 1st-order 
information were modeled (middle blue, t(18)= -3.41, p= .003). Error bars depict ± 1 standard deviation. pMTG: posterior middle temporal 




3. Results 380 
Participants answered on average 26.4 out of 32 question trials correctly (SD = 3.27), indicating a high 381 
attentiveness during the fMRI session. 382 
 383 
3.1 Behavioral Results 384 
3.1.1 Results of the post-fMRI SRTT 385 
The multiple regression testing for effects of the 1st-order and 2nd-order conditional probabilities on the 386 
logarithmized RTs revealed a significant negative relationship between 1st-order conditional probability and 387 
RTs, showing that higher 1st-order probabilities led to faster RTs (t(17)= -6.92, p < .001, two-tailed, M= -0.12, 388 
SD= 0.07 of the standardized coefficients). This effect was consistent across all participants. The effect of the 389 
2nd-order conditional probability was also significant (t(17) = 2.37, p= .030, two-tailed, M= 0.03, SD= 0.06), 390 
indicating slower RTs with higher 2nd-order probabilities (see Figure 3). Thirteen out of the 18 tested 391 
participants showed a positive correlation between 2nd-order conditional probabilities and RTs. As we conducted 392 
multiple regressions, those results show that RTs were slower for higher 2nd-order conditional probabilities 393 
whilst controlling for an effect of 1st-order conditional probabilities.  394 
We furthermore wanted to test whether the effect of 2nd-order conditional probabilities depended on the 395 
degree to which expectations based on 1st-order conditional probabilities had been modulated by these 2nd-order 396 
conditional probabilities. To that end, we conducted a median split of the data for each participant, dividing 397 
trials by whether the 2nd order modulated the 1st order to a greater or lesser extent. We performed two multiple 398 
regressions parallel to the multiple regression described above, with 1st-order and 2nd-order conditional 399 
probability, as well as trial number, as predictors. The resulting standardized coefficients for the 2nd-order 400 
conditional probability depending on how strongly the 2nd order changed the expectations based on the 1st-order 401 
conditional probabilities were tested against each other using a paired t-test. A marginally significant difference 402 
was revealed (t(17)= 2.04, p= .057, two-sided). Thus, RTs showed a trend for being more strongly modulated by 403 
2nd-order probabilities if those modulated the expectations based on 1st-order probabilities strongly (M= 0.11, 404 








Results of the serial reaction time post-test. a) Mean beta weights expressing the relationship between 1st - and 2nd-order conditional 
probabilities and reaction times. Reaction times decreased with increasing 1st-order conditional probabilities and increased with increasing 
2nd-order conditional probabilities b) Comparison between effects of 2nd-order conditional probabilities on reaction times in dependence on 
the degree to which 1st-order conditional probabilities were modulated by the 2nd order. Reaction times showed a trend towards a stronger 
modulation by 2nd-order conditional if 1st-order conditional probabilities were modulated to a larger extent. Error bars depict ± 1 standard 
deviation. * p< .05, + p< .06. 
 410 
3.1.2 Results of the post-fMRI paper-pencil test 411 
The results of the paper-pencil post-test, which assessed knowledge of the 1st-order structure, further 412 
corroborated the significant effect of 1st-order conditional probabilities on RTs. The repeated-measures ANOVA 413 
testing for an overall effect of the factor PROBABILITY on the assigned weight turned out significant (F(3, 414 
51)= 18.17, p< .001, partial ƞ= .52). As we expected rated probabilities to reflect actually implemented 415 
probabilities, planned paired t-tests were conducted between the single successive levels. We found no 416 
difference between probabilities of 0 and 0.125 (t(17)= 1.61, p= .063, one-tailed, d= 0.38), a marginally 417 
significant difference between probabilities of 0.125 and 0.25 (t(17)= 2.09, p= .026, one-tailed, d= 0.49) and a 418 
significant difference between 0.25 and 0.375 (t(17)= 3.48, p= .002, one-tailed, d= 0.82), with an alpha-level of 419 
.017, adjusted for the three comparisons (see Figure 4; note that the mean assigned values were scaled by the 420 
factor 12.5 to match the scaling of the implemented probabilities). This indicates that participants formed 421 
predictions based on the 1st-order conditional probabilities, and that their representation of 1st-order conditional 422 
probabilities was more precise for higher probability values. None of the participants claimed conscious 423 





Results of the paper-pencil post-test, showing that assigned probabilities increased as implemented probabilities increased. Number of 
assigned crosses was multiplied by 12.5 to achieve same scaling as underlying probabilities. Error bars depict ± 1 standard deviation. * p< 
.017, + p< .03. 
 426 
3.2 fMRI Results 427 
Manipulating the amount of information provided by the 1st and 2nd order of the statistical structure 428 
independently of each other allowed us to assess functional correlates of the exploitation of each of the levels 429 
independently. Furthermore, it enabled us to investigate how the amount of information provided by the 1st 430 
order affects exploitation of further information provided by the 2nd order. 431 
1) Effects of 1st-order information 432 
The contrast testing for a modulation of the BOLD response by the amount of information provided by 433 
the 1st-order structure yielded an attenuation of activation in the predicted network of ventral premotor cortex 434 
(PMv), the midposterior part of the intraparietal sulcus (mIPS), and the fusiform gyrus and posterior middle 435 
temporal gyrus (pMTG), which is classically reported for action observation (see Table 1 for a list of all 436 
activations, Figure 2b). Since information provided by the 1st-order structure and information provided by the 437 
2nd order were modeled simultaneously, this finding shows that increased predictability based on information 438 
provided by the 1st-order structure can reduce activation even when information from the 2nd-order structure is 439 





Table 1: MNI coordinates and maximal z-scores of significantly activated clusters following correction for 444 
multiple comparison for the parametric contrast of information provided by the 1st-order structure 445 





 x y z   
ventral premotor cortex  -41 1 33 -4.39 11691 
37 4 33 -4.22 9855 
midposterior intraparietal sulcus -17 -62 48 -3.99 8559 
25 -53 42 -3.38 1998 
midposterior intraparietal sulcus/ Precuneus 
(BA 19) 
13 -65 54 -2.87 567 
28 -71 22 -2.97 810 
Fusiform gyrus /  
posterior middle temporal gyrus 
-50 -59 0 -3.96 6939 
40 -50 -21 -3.06 1107 
 446 
2) Effects of 2nd-order information 447 
We expected 2nd-order information to draw onto activation in the AON as well, though we considered either a 448 
positive or a negative correlation as possible.  449 
Higher 2nd-order information was associated with a decrease of activation in mIPS, which overlapped 450 
with the cluster observed in the 1st-order contrast (1188 mm3 in the left, 432 mm3 in the right hemisphere; see 451 
Figure 2d for a conjunction of the two contrasts). The mIPS was the only area for which an overlap was 452 
revealed. We found an increase in activation with higher 2nd-order information in pMTG and superior parieto-453 
occipital cortex (SPOC). An unhypothesized positive correlation between BOLD activation and 2nd-order 454 
information was furthermore revealed in the right temporal pole (see Table 2 for a list of all activations, Figure 455 
2c). Those findings show that 2nd-order information is spontaneously integrated, independent of 1st-order 456 
information. To additionally test which areas are more sensitive towards 1st- than towards 2nd-order information, 457 
we calculated the direct contrast between the two parametric regressors. This contrast revealed significantly 458 
higher activation for the 2nd-order in the premotor cortex and the pMTG, showing that activation there was more 459 
strongly attenuated by 1st-order information (see supplementary Table 1 and supplementary Figure 1). 460 
To test for the hypothesized correlation between 2nd-order information and activation in the 461 
hippocampal formation reflecting effects for retrieval of 2nd-order information, we additionally conducted an 462 
ROI analysis in the anterior hippocampus. ROI coordinates were taken from a previous publication of our group 463 
 
(Ahlheim et al., 2014) and were based on reported effects of sensitivity of the hippocampus to entropy 464 
(Bornstein & Daw, 2012; Harrison et al., 2006; Strange et al., 2005). The center of the ROI in the left 465 
hippocampus was at x = −25, y = −16, z = −18, and the center of the ROI in the right anterior hippocampus was 466 
at x = 31,y = −17, z = −19. Both ROIs had a sphere with a radius of two adjacent voxels (6 mm). Unexpectedly, 467 
neither ROI showed a significant modulation by 2nd-order information (all p> .09, Bonferroni-corrected alpha-468 
level of .025; see Table 3 for inferential statistics). 469 
 470 
 Table 2: MNI coordinates and maximal z-scores of significantly activated clusters following correction for 471 
multiple comparison for the parametric contrast of information provided by the 2nd-order structure. 472 





 x y z   
dorsal premotor cortex  
local maximum in pCC 
28 -11 54 3.82 
4725 
 7 -12 39 3.58 
midposterior intraparietal sulcus -29 -59 30 -2.91 594 
25 -50 36 -3.31 3294 
posterior middle temporal gyrus -50 -68 18 3.11 405 
37 -62 9 4.23 4455 
superior parieto-occipital cortex (BA 18) -20 -89 15 3.00 648 
16 -92 21 4.56 13851 
Temporal pole 52 4 -30 3.50 4401 
 473 
Table 3: Inferential statistics of hippocampal ROI analyses. 474 
 t(18) p 
Parametric effect of 1st-order 
information 
left hippocampus 1.75 .097 
right hippocampus 0.42 .683 
Parametric effect of 2nd-order 
information 
left hippocampus 1.29 .212 
right hippocampus 1.75 .096 
Parametric effect of interaction 
term 
left hippocampus -0.25 .806 
right hippocampus -0.07 .943 
 475 
 
3) 1st-order dependent exploitation of 2nd-order information 476 
We hypothesized that exploitation of the 2nd-order information depends on the amount of information 477 
provided by the 1st-order structure. To test this, we included an interaction term modeling only those events for 478 
which the 1st-order structure provided least information (lowest 25% of the distribution) or the most information 479 
(uppermost 25% of the distribution). The interaction therefore reveals areas that were significantly more 480 
strongly modulated by information provided by the 2nd-order structure if the 1st-order structure provided only 481 
little information about the upcoming event. We found that activation in the PMd, the IPS, the precuneus, and 482 
the occipito-temporal lobe were more strongly modulated by information provided by the 2nd order of the 483 
statistical structure when less information was provided by the 1st-order structure.  484 
Additionally, the interaction contrast yielded the predicted modulation of activity in lateral BA 10. BA 485 
10 did not show a significant modulation by 2nd-order information or 1st-order information alone, which 486 
indicates that it is more strongly modulated by information provided by the 2nd order if integration of this 487 
information was actually beneficial, i.e. when the 1st-order provided less information (see Table 4 for a list of all 488 
activations, Figure 2e). As can be seen from the bar chart in Figure 2e, this interaction effect was indeed driven 489 
by the cases in which 1st-order information was low.  490 
Notably, the pattern of this revealed interaction effect also held when modeling all instead of only the 491 
most (un-) informative 25% of trials (data not shown).  492 
 493 
 
Table 4: MNI coordinates and maximal z-scores of significantly activated clusters following correction for 494 
multiple comparison for the interaction contrast of information provided by the 2nd-order structure, depending 495 
on the amount of information provided by the 1st-order structure. 496 





 x y z   
anterior prefrontal cortex:  BA 10 32 52 9 -3.23 
5481 
BA 11 14 50 -15 -3.82 
dorsal premotor cortex  -23 -8 60 -4.27 5076 
 22 -2 57 -3.72 4428 
Parietal and occipital 
lobe 
intraparietal sulcus -29 -44 57 -5.49 
201285 
33 -40 56 -4.68 
Precuneus -9 -62 68 -4.90 
13 -65 46 -4.56 
superior parieto-
occipital cortex 
-15 -101 -6 -5.20 
posterior middle 
temporal gyrus 
-38 -87 -13 -5.13 
39 -70 -17 -4.47 
Thalamus 16 -26 12 -4.00 1080 
Cerebellum 10 -71 -33 -3.03 621 




4. Discussion 499 
While it is well established that humans use predictive information in their environment to prepare for 500 
upcoming events, it is still unclear to what extent and under which conditions they do so. It is one of the 501 
currently most urgent questions how the brain selects the sources of information to generate predictions 502 
(Blokpoel, Kwisthout, & van Rooij, 2012; Phillips, 2013). The present study investigated whether information 503 
from an action's 2nd-order statistical structure is exploited in dependence on the information provided on the 1st 504 
level; in other words, whether the brain predicts upcoming actions in a cost-benefit sensitive manner. 505 
Our results show that the brain exploits 1st- as well as 2nd-order statistical information, and that it does 506 
so in a cost-benefit effective manner. Our findings are threefold: first, the information derived from the action at 507 
t-1 saves processing costs of the upcoming action. Second, at the same point in time, information from the t-2 508 
action is additionally exploited and facilitates the observer's predictions further. And finally, information 509 
derived from the t-2 action is exploited more when the last action alone is less useful in shaping expectations. 510 
 511 
Attenuation in the action observation network based on 1st-order statistical information 512 
The first aim to the present study was to replicate and expand previous findings concerning the neural 513 
correlates of an increase in predictability by the 1st-order structure in action sequences (Ahlheim et al., 2014). 514 
We established in our behavioral post-tests that human observers learned 1st-order conditional probabilities and 515 
were particularly good at discriminating between action pairs of high conditional probability, even though no 516 
participant reported noticing those regularities in a post-experimental survey.  517 
Previous studies reported that valid prediction of upcoming events leads to decreased activity levels in 518 
brain areas that code for these events, and that predictive information facilitates perception (Bar, 2004; den 519 
Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; Summerfield et al., 2008). We extended these 520 
findings to the case of action observation and found that an increase in the amount of 1st-order information led to 521 
the predicted attenuation of activity in the action observation network, composed of PMv, mIPS, and posterior 522 
temporal cortex (Caspers et al., 2010; Jeannerod, 2001). This shows that prediction of the upcoming action step 523 
was facilitated by information provided by the 1st-order structure. The established attenuation in this network 524 
adds to previous findings, showing that prediction-facilitating effects of 1st-order structure also occur in the 525 
presence of a 2nd-order structure.  526 
 527 
Integration of 2nd-order statistical information 528 
 
To test whether human observers are capable of processing the 2nd-order conditional probabilities in 529 
our paradigm, we modeled the amount of information provided by the 2nd-order structure. We found that 530 
activation of the mIPS decreased with the additional information provided by the 2nd order, on top of the 531 
decrease that mIPS showed as a function of 1st-order information. The mIPS was the only component of the 532 
AON that showed this pattern. The mIPS has been found to be a central focus of execution as well as 533 
observation of reaching movements (Vingerhoets, 2014). It is particularly interesting here that the mIPS area 534 
that we found is suggested to underlie the coupling of reaching and eye movements that is needed when we 535 
pursue visual hand input during reaching (Vesia & Crawford, 2012). Using temporally occluded targets during 536 
smooth pursuit eye movements, Lencer and co-workers (2004) found that this area bridges target occlusion, 537 
pointing to a role in anticipatory saccade tuning. In our paradigm, using 2nd-order information increases the 538 
predictability of the upcoming action step further, which allows for a more precise prediction of which object is 539 
going to be grasped next, and where this object can be found in the scene. This interpretation is in line with a 540 
recent finding showing that separable subregions of the intraparietal sulcus are modulated by processing 541 
unexpected events as well as events that require an adaptation of a currently valid predictive model (O’Reilly et 542 
al., 2013).  The further attenuation of mIPS activation with 2nd-order information here reflects the further 543 
reduced processing costs of the upcoming reaching of the object, as target and direction of the reaching can be 544 
better predicted.  545 
Contrary to 1st-order information, 2nd-order information could not be accessed directly through a 546 
pairwise association between action t-2 and t. Instead, it was necessary to retrieve information about the action 547 
step t-2 from memory and furthermore integrate this information with the information provided by the action t-1 548 
on the 1st order, as the action step at t-2 alone was not informative of t. Potentially, these additional processing 549 
costs could further account for the unpredicted finding of increased RTs with 2nd-order conditional probabilities 550 
in our post-fMRI SRTT: here, RTs increased with higher 2nd-order conditional probabilities whilst controlling 551 
for an effect of 1st-order conditional probabilities. Further, a trend-level effect (p= .057) tentatively suggests that 552 
these processing costs, reflected in RT increase, is higher when 2nd-order information changed expectations 553 
based on the 1st-order conditional probabilities to a larger extent. Studies on learning of 2nd-order statistical 554 
regularities using a SRTT reported a decrease of RTs as reflection of statistical learning (Curran, 1989; 555 
Remillard, 2008). Speculating on possible reasons for the diverging results, it should be noted that our SRTT 556 
differed in a critical point from a standard SRTT: Statistical regularities among the action steps were already 557 
established at the beginning of the testing, whereas the association between observed object and button press 558 
 
was not. How and when the processing costs of higher-order information begin to turn into a behavioral benefit 559 
thus needs to be explored further. 560 
On the neural level, we expected that the retrieval of information about the action step t-2, which is 561 
necessary to asses 2nd-order information, would be reflected in an increased hippocampal activation with more 562 
2nd-order information. Yet, using an ROI analysis, we did not find evidence for an increase of activation (p> .09) 563 
with increasing information provided by the 2nd-order structure in the hippocampus. We found, however, an 564 
unhypothesized increase of activation in the right temporal pole, the more information was provided by the 2nd-565 
order, as well as in the pMTG and the SPOC. The temporal pole is considered as “semantic hub” where 566 
semantic information about entities is processed, irrespective of their modality (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 567 
2007). In particular, it decodes conceptual object properties that go beyond the object’s properties, as for 568 
instance the associated manipulation or the usual location of the object (Peelen & Caramazza, 2012). 569 
Furthermore, the temporal pole has been found to show a higher activation for initially biased perceptual 570 
decisions, and to pass this perceptual bias to visual areas (Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). In the present study, 571 
higher 2nd-order information led to an increase in predictability of the upcoming action step and its associated 572 
object – in other words, the expectation of the upcoming action became more biased. This allows for a retrieval 573 
of semantic knowledge about the object – for instance, its shape or how it will be grasped and manipulated. We 574 
suggest that this retrieval of conceptual knowledge also drove the activation in the temporal pole in our study. 575 
Conceptual information is then passed to visual areas, i.e. the SPOC and pMTG. Area SPOC, at the mesial 576 
boundary between IPS and occipital lobe, is proposed to store internal representations of reach-to-grasp goals 577 
(Vesia & Crawford, 2012). We propose that here enhanced activation in SPOC reflects the maintenance of 578 
likely reach targets and their locations, which informs monitoring of the reaching movement in more parietal 579 
sites. Processing of this target, which is an object, is additionally enhanced in pMTG, which is a key-site of the 580 
processing man-made tools (Beauchamp & Martin, 2007). It should be noted though that we did not distinguish 581 
between different aspects of an action, that is the involved object and its manipulation. However, the amount of 582 
information provided by a certain object or action step varied depending on its position in the sequence, 583 
ensuring that the identity of the object itself could not be the cause of the effects revealed here. 584 
 585 
Evidence for information-state dependent use of 2nd-order information 586 
To test the hypothesis that exploitation of the 2nd-order statistical structure depends on the amount of 587 
information provided by the 1st order, we conducted a parametric analysis for those events on which the 1st order 588 
was of very high or low informative value and tested for an interaction effect of 1st- and 2nd-order information. 589 
 
We found that activation in the PMd, the IPS, the pMTG, and the SPOC was more strongly modulated by the 590 
interaction term. Those areas, which have been described as the core areas of the AON (Caspers et al., 2010), 591 
were thus modulated more strongly by 2nd-order information when 1st-order information was low. This provides 592 
evidence for our hypothesis that higher-order information is preferentially used if 1st-order information is 593 
insufficient to generate precise predictions. Exploitation of 2nd-order information causes higher processing costs, 594 
as a retrieval of the action at t-2 is necessary and 2nd-order information needs to be integrated with 1st-order 595 
information. Thus, we hypothesized exploitation of 2nd-order information to depend on a cost-benefit criterion: 596 
we expected 2nd-information to be used the more, the less information was provided by the 1st order. Areas 597 
implementing this cost-benefit criterion should show a correlation with the interaction term of 1st-and 2nd-order 598 
information, rather than with either main effect. We hypothesized that BA 10 implements this cost-benefit trade-599 
off by bolstering search for additional information from the action at t-2 if action t-1 was of only little 600 
informative value. With the current paradigm and methods, some uncertainty remains as to whether BA 10 601 
activation reflects the cost-benefit optimized exploitation of 2nd-order information or the increased search for 602 
additional information from preceding actions. 603 
 In line with our hypothesis, we found that activity in the lateral BA 10 was correlated with the 604 
interaction term. This correlation resulted from a stronger correlation of activity in the BA 10 with 2nd-order 605 
information if the 1st order provided only little information, i.e. if the action step t-1 did not allow for a 606 
sufficiently precise prediction of action t. Notably, significant activation of the BA 10 was only revealed in the 607 
interaction contrast. This corroborates our hypothesis that BA 10 recruitment increases under low 1st-order 608 
predictability and enhances the exploitation of 2nd-order information. Across a variety of different paradigms, 609 
BA 10 has been reported to be activated when several relations among tasks or rules have to be integrated or 610 
organized (Golde, Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; Nee et al., 2013; Ramnani & Owen, 611 
2004; Schubotz, 2011). Here, and in line with findings from Golde et al. (2010), we showed that the BA 10 is 612 
also engaged when information derived from actions needs to be integrated. A particularly interesting parallel to 613 
our paradigm is the engagement of BA 10 in uncertainty-driven search for information, when available cues 614 
provide insufficient information (Badre et al., 2012). Whereas information in the study by Badre and co-workers 615 
(2012) could be gained by searching the environment, in the present study information was gained through 616 
retrieval of the action at t-2. Our results suggest that BA 10 may particularly contribute to a strategic retrieval of 617 
associations if these associations provide a clear gain in information. In other words, BA 10 may implement an 618 
efficiency criterion for the exploitation of higher-order information, presumably both in actions as well as in 619 
abstract stimuli. 620 
 
 621 
Conclusion  622 
The present findings provide several novel insights about the neurofunctional mechanisms underlying 623 
the prediction of observed action sequences. It shows that human observers spontaneously use both 1st- and 2nd-624 
order statistical structure to predict upcoming actions, especially when little information is provided by the 1st 625 
order. In particular, 1st-order statistical information in action sequences is automatically exploited and results in 626 
a faster and more efficient processing of the upcoming action step, manifesting in smaller RTs and a significant 627 
attenuation in the action observation network, respectively. Furthermore, information provided by the 2nd-order 628 
structure is retrieved and integrated to sharpen expectations, as indicated by activation increase in the temporal 629 
pole, and by attenuation in the IPS. Findings suggest that frontolateral BA 10 moderates the retrieval and 630 
integration of 2nd-order information, in line with the emerging understanding of this brain area as a hub for 631 
strategic integration of information from various sources.  632 
 633 
Notes 634 
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